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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Different approaches to environmental regulation 
 
Industrial production is a major source of global pollution, and it is widely recognised 
that regulation is required to reduce this pollution for the benefit of society. However, 
there  is  considerable  debate  about  the  most  effective  approach  to  environmental 
regulation,  which  can  be  broadly  classified  according  to  three  main  categories  of 
regulatory  instrument.  Direct  regulation  comprises  standards  or  commands  and 
prohibitions  in  relation  to  inputs,  processes  and  outputs.  Economic  instruments 
include  duties  (e.g.  taxes,  charges),  tradable  emission  permits  (e.g.  EU  Emissions 
Trading Scheme for CO2) and environmental liability (Kuik and Osterhuis, 2008). 
Finally, soft instruments include voluntary industry agreements, communication and 
information measures, environmental certification schemes (e.g. ISO 14001, EMAS, 
EU  Ecolabel),  and  green  procurement.  Economic  theory  states  that  "efficient" 
regulation  necessarily  achieves  pollution  reduction  at  least  cost,  but  it  can  be 
challenging  to  even  quantify  the  starting  point  for  any  assessment  of  efficiency: 
regulatory effectiveness.   
 
A  considerable  body  of  evidence  attests  to  the  general  effectiveness  of  direct 
environmental  regulation.  Integrated  Pollution  Prevention  Control  regulation 
(Directive 96/61/EC) is the most widespread and comprehensive example of direct 
regulation for industry. Numerous studies have found that IPPC licensing has had a 
significantly  positive  influence  on  environmental  performance  (Silvo  et  al.,  2002; 
Environment Agency, 2004; Honkasalo et al., 2005; EEA, 2008; Mirasgedis et al., 
2008; Styles et al., 2009b). A few studies have demonstrated that the implementation 
of Best Available Techniques (BAT: http://eippcb.jrc.ec.europa.eu/), as required by 
IPPC regulation, results in a significant net social benefit with respect to the control of 
specific pollutants (Clinch and Kerins, 2002; AEA, 2007). However, other studies 
have questioned the comparative efficiency of  IPPC regulation,  and its impact on 
competitiveness (Hitchens et al., 2001; Ederington and Minier, 2003; López-Gamero 
et al., 2009). Hemmelskamp (1999) notes that direct regulation fails to incentivize 
continuous pollution reduction below mandated  standards for individual operators. 
There  are  few  ex  post  cost  analyses  of  IPPC  BAT  implementation  owing  to  the 
reluctance of operators to provide cost data (IVM, 2006).  
 
Compared with direct regulation, economic instruments offer a number of potential 
advantages, including a wider sphere of influence (that includes small enterprises), 
potentially low implementation costs (e.g. fuel taxes), and provision of an incentive 
for  continuous  improvement  (Hemmelskamp,  1999).  Well-documented  theoretical 
efficiency  advantages  of  market-based  instruments,  compared  with  command-and-
control instruments, include the least-cost distribution of pollution reduction across 
installations, and the stimulation of innovation ( Jaffe at al., 2002; Requate and Unold, 
2003).  Experience  with  cap-and-trade  of  SOx  in  the  US  has  partially  borne  these 
predictions  out  (Ellerman,  2003;  Burtraw  et  al.,  2005),  although  California's 
experience with the RECLAIM NOx emission trading scheme highlights the need for 
intensive  management  and  careful  allowance  allocation  (SCAQMDS,  2007). 
Economic  instruments  are  applicable  to  a  limited  range  of  readily  quantifiable 
parameters (e.g. resource use, CO2 and SOx emissions). It has also been noted that allocative efficiency advantages of market instruments may be confined in practice 
owing  to  sectors  and  companies  being  exempted  or  compensated  as  a  result  of 
competitiveness concerns or targeted lobbying (Ellerman, 2003; Palm and Larsson, 
2007).  
 
Soft  instruments,  in  particular  accredited  Environmental  Management  Systems 
(EMS), are often designed to encourage adoption through economic incentives such 
as the development of intangible assets (e.g. staff training on efficient management of 
processes)  and  marketing  opportunities  associated  with  certification  or  product-
labelling. Accordingly, studies have assessed the influence of soft instruments on both 
the  environmental  and  economic  performance  of  firms.  Whilst  many  studies  have 
attributed positive environmental performance effects to EMS adoption (King et al., 
2005; Newbold, 2006; Radonjic & Tomic, 2007; Arimura et al., 2008), others have 
concluded  that  EMS  implementation  has  no  significant  influence  (Dahlstrom  et.al 
2003; Barla, 2007). A recent study of 100 firms concluded that well-designed EMS 
can  improve  environmental  performance  through  technical  and  organizational 
innovations,  but  there  was  little  evidence  of  any  positive  effect  on  market 
performance, resource productivity or intangible assets (Iraldo et al., 2009). Detecting 
and attributing longer-term economic impacts is difficult. It has been suggested that 
voluntary regulation is more important where direct regulation is weak (Radonjič and 
Tominc,  2007),  although  multinational  companies  with  strong  corporate  social 
responsibility  (CSR)  may  be  less  likely  to  locate  in  countries  with  weak  direct 
regulation.  Ultimately,  it  is  not  just  the  approach,  but  the  specific  design  (e.g. 
standards  versus  technologies),  inclusion  of  dynamic  aspects,  coverage  (e.g. 
exceptions, inclusion of old plants, etc), and implementation (flexibility, enforcement, 
etc) that influence the efficiency of regulation (Kuntze, 1999).   
  
1.2. Assessing the effect of environmental regulation on competitiveness  through 
paradigms  
 
Broadly  speaking,  the  debate  about  the  effect  of  environmental  regulation  on 
production  efficiency  and  competitiveness  has  been  shaped  by  two  competing 
paradigms. From a traditional economics perspective, environmental regulation exists 
soley to correct for (internalise) negative externalities, and necessarily has a negative 
impact  on  the  production  efficiency  and  competitiveness  of  industry  (Gollop  and 
Robert, 1983; Gray and Shadbegian, 1998; Cole and Elliot, 2003; Ederington and 
Minier, 2003). For instance Gray and Shadbegian (2003) found that more stringent air 
and water regulations have a significant impact on paper mills’ technological choice 
in the U.S. Their results suggest that regulation diverts investment from productivity 
to  abatement,  consistent  with  the  standard  paradigm.  Furthermore,  environmental 
regulation  can  have  a  deterrent  effect  on  foreign  direct  investment:  using  a 
simultaneous model to study the relationship between FDI and final industrial SO2 
emissions in China, He (2006) found evidences for the ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis. 
 
Meanwhile, a “Revisionist” view suggests that environmental regulation can stimulate 
competitive advantage through efficiency improvements, innovation, and new “green” 
market opportunities (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné, 1993; Porter and van der Linde, 
1995a;  Sinclair-Desgagné,  1999).  The  revisionist  view  assumes  that  firms  do  not 
necessarily  implement  the  most  efficient  technology  options  owing  to  innovation uncertainty,  bounded  rationality
1  (Berkhout  et  al.,  2001),  and  effort  discretion 
(Altman,  2001).  Altman  argues  that,  by  providing  additional  incentive  to  address 
existing inefficiencies (to offset pollution reduction costs), environmental regulation 
can achieve social benefit at little or no private cost. In a review of ex-post costs of 
environmental regulations, IVM (2006) found real-world examples of this for direct 
regulation  (Nitrates  Directive  and  control  of  ozone-depleting-substances).  Wagner 
(2003) suggests that flexible (voluntary and market-based) regulations are more likely 
than command-and-control regulations to stimulate the kind of innovation central to 
the revisionist view proposed by Porter and van der Linde (1995a).  
 
A  somewhat  intermediate  paradigm  is  the  Resource-Based  view  of  firm 
competitiveness,  in  which  the  long-term  competitiveness  of  firms  is  deemed 
dependent on their ability to optimise use of available resources (Fouts and Russo, 
1997). Crucially, the Resource-Based view expands on the traditional definition of 
resources to recognise intangible assets such as know how (Teece, 1980), corporate 
culture  (Barney,  1986),  and  reputation  (Hall,  1992).  Within  this  context,  well-
designed environmental regulation is seen as an incentive and opportunity to achieve 
private as well as social benefits (Sinclair-Desgagné, 1999). Similarly, expanding the 
definition of production efficiency to include pollution as an input cost, can redefine 
regulation as positive driver of production efficiency (Telle and Larsson, 2007).  
 
The aforementioned paradigms have polarised the debate on environmental regulation 
somewhat, further complicating the already complex and fragmented assessment of 
regulatory  efficiency.  Quantitative  studies  are  necessarily  restricted  in  scope.  In 
particular,  the  econometric  models  that  play  such  an  important  role  in  assessing 
regulatory efficiency, and comparing different approaches,  are usually  confined to 
single parameters (e.g. CO2 or SOx emissions). In this sense, they diverge from the 
practice of industry regulation (local authority and IPPC licensing), where the need 
for an integrated approach to pollution control has long been recognised. In this sense, 
industry perceptions remain an important, though not unbiased, source of information 
on the real-world effects of environmental regulation. IVM (2006) note a number of 
instances where industries substantially over-estimated compliance costs, possibly in 
an attempt to avert more stringent regulations.   
 
 
1.3.Study aims  
 
A  recent  study  of  Irish  IPPC-licensed  pharmaceutical  manufacturers  used  an 
integrated  (multi-pollutant),  quantitative  approach  to  calculate  the  pollution 
avoidance, relative to 1995 eco-efficiency, that was specifically attributable to IPPC 
and preceding IPC regulation (Styles et al. 2009b). In this paper, we use questionnaire 
responses regarding the cost and processes influences of IPPC regulation to assess the 
efficiency of this pollution avoidance. Meanwhile, a recent study of chemical-for-
building-products  manufacturers  in  the  Padania  region  of  Northern  Italy  ("Italian 
building-chemicals sector") has collated data on industry perceptions regarding the 
influence of different types of environmental regulation on operating practices. In this 
paper, we draw on the complementary quantitative and qualitative findings of these 
                                                 
1Referred to as paradigm blindness ("what we do is best") in the IPPC reference document on energy 
efficiency (EC, 2009).  separate studies to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of direct regulation, and 
posit some conclusions. The main objectives of this paper are to: 
1.  Report industry perceptions on the effectiveness of direct regulation compared 
with other approaches  
2.  Assess  the  efficiency  of  direct  regulation  in  terms  of  public  benefit  and 





2.1.  Irish and Italian case study sectors  
 
The pharma sector is one of Ireland’s main export sectors, dominating the chemical 
sector that contributes €14 billion per year gross value added to the Irish economy 
(CSO, 2008). This sector is composed of 36 large installations regulated under IPPC 
licensing. Multi-national parent companies  are image conscious, and operators are 
generally  compliant  with  IPPC  licences  (EPA,  2006).  Operators  engage  with 
voluntary  regulation  through  high  levels  of  formal  EMS  accreditation  and 
environmental performance reporting in Responsible Care reports (IBEC, 2007). This 
sector has been subject to direct regulation since the early 1980s, first under Single 
Media Licensing of air and water emissions, then under Integrated Pollution Control 
licensing (from 1994 onwards), and now under EU IPPC licensing. It offers valuable 
insight into the effectiveness of direct and voluntary regulation.  
 
The  chemical  sector  is  an  important  and  expanding  economic  sector  in  Italy, 
comprising  23,034  local  units  employing  about  400,000  employees.  Sixty-three 
percent  of  chemical  sector  enterprises,  and  67%  of  employees,  are  based  in  the 
Padania  region  of  northern  Italy.  The  segment
2  of  chemical  for  building  products 
represents just a small part of whole sector, comprising approximately 110 companies 
and  employing  approximately  12,000  employees  in  the  Padania  region  (ISTAT, 
2005). The building-chemical sub-sector produces intermediate goods such as dyes, 
paints, glues and insulating materials for the building & construction sector, and is 
subject to numerous EU environmental regulations that define limits for air and water 
emissions  from  process  plants  (e.g.  for  heavy  metals  and  chlorinated  organics). 
Within  the  sector,  titanium  dioxide  producers  and  choralkali  plants  are  subject  to 
particular regulatory scrutiny. The IPPC Directive has a broad impact on the Irish 
pharma  and  Italian  building-chemicals  industries,  requiring  authorisation  and 
monitoring  of  large-scale  chemical  processes,  and  compliance  with  minimum 
performance standards according to BAT. In Ireland, all IPPC-licensed installations 
are mandated to implement Environmental Management Programmes (EMP), similar 




                                                 
2 The sector chemical for building is not well defined by the Statistical classification of economic 
activities in the European Community.  The NACE codes that potentially refer to this sector are 20.12.0 
Manufacture of dyes and pigments, 20.30.0 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, 
printing  ink  and  mastics,  20.52.0  Manufacture  of  glues  22.23.0  Manufacture  of  builders’  ware  of 
plastic, 22.19.0 Manufacture of other rubber products, 22.21.0 Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, 
tubes and profiles, 22.29.0 Manufacture of other plastic products 2.2. Irish pharma manufacturers:  survey data  
 
Two questionnaires were sent to all 36 of Ireland's pharma manufacturers, addressed 
specifically  to  environmental  managers  where  these  contact  details  were  available 
(most  instances).  In  November  2007  Survey  1  (Appendix  A)  was  sent.  This 
questionnaire asked detailed and installation-specific questions about various aspects 
of IPPC licensing, and included reference to production effects and compliance costs. 
Following a low response rate to Survey 1 (eight respondents), a second shorter and 
anonymous  questionnaire  (Survey  2:  Appendix  B)  was  sent  in  March  2009.  This 
followed  from  an  introduction  to  the  survey,  and  an  overview  of  study  data  and 
objectives,  presented  to  environmental  managers  at  a  Pharmachemical  Ireland 
meeting. Twenty responses were received to Survey 2, and quantitative data from it 
underpin pollution avoidance calculated in Styles et al. (2009b). Integrated licensing 
was  ranked  as  the  most  important  driver  of  emissions  reductions,  followed  by 
corporate  social  and  environmental  policy,  improved  technology  and  technical 
knowledge,  cost-saving  efficiencies,  voluntary  guidelines  for  the  sector,  and  EMS 
accreditation. In this paper, we interpret data provided from both questionnaires.              
 
Previous  work  collated  data  for  twenty  of  the  most  environmentally  significant 
emissions to air and water from Ireland’s pharma sector, and aggregated them based 
on environmental damage potential
3 so that they could be interpreted as a single index 
of pollution (Styles et al., 2009a). For the study reported here, we calculated pollution 
avoidance for 27 core Pharma installations that have been in continuous operation 
since 1995, and for which compliance costs over this period could be estimated (Fig. 
2).  The  methodology  is  described  in  detail  in  Styles  et  al.  (2009b),  where  it  was 
applied to the entire sector (36 installations in 2007: Fig. 3)
4. Crucially, the context of 
the question in Survey 2 (see Appendix B) used to estimate the specific contribution 
of IPPC regulation towards quantified pollution avoidance, enabled the additionality 
of  IPPC  regulation  to  be  clearly  quantified  relative  to  the  influence  of  voluntary 
regulation (included in "business-as-usual pollution": Fig. 2).    
 
Low  and  high  external  cost  estimates  for  the  various  emissions  considered  in  the 
pollution  index  were  taken  from  the  literature,  primarily  from  the  IPPC  BAT 
assessment reference document (EC, 2006) - these values reflect only crop damage 
and  human  health  impacts.  It  was  impossible  to  find  external  cost  data  for  some 
emissions (e.g. heavy metal emissions to air and water), so conservative estimates 
were  made  for  these  in  relation  to  other  emission  costs  (Table  4).  Low  and  high 
aggregated costs of pollution avoided as a consequence of IPPC regulation were thus 
used  to  estimate  the  social  benefit  of  IPPC  regulation.  This  was  compared  with 
annualised IPPC compliance costs, derived from responses to Survey  1. Costs for 
previous years were inflated according to the wholesale price index (CSO, 2009), and 
all capital investment costs were expressed as annualised depreciation costs assuming 
a 15 year lifespan. The component of these costs associated with control of air and 
                                                 
3 According to life cycle impact assessment methods 
4 Rreported emission data were used to produce an emissions time series from 1995 to 2007. Then, 
1995 emissions were extrapolated to 2007 according to constant eco-intensity per volume of 
production. "Avoided" emissions were calculated as the difference between extrapolated and actual 
(reported) 2007 emissions. Questionnaire responses (median percentages) from Survey 2 were then 
used to ascertain that IPPC licensing was responsible for 50% of air emission avoidance and 30% of 
water emission avoidance (Styles et al., 2009b). water emissions was identified (Survey 1). These cost data were extrapolated up to the 
27 installations that were in operation since 1995, based on the relative contribution of 
the  seven  cost-respondents  to  pollution  loading  from  the  27  installations  (23%  in 
2007: Fig. 3). This was necessary as the emissions, production, and survey 2 data 
enabled the estimation of IPPC pollution avoidance only at the more aggregate level.       
 
 
2.3. Italian building-chemicals manufacturers:  survey data 
 
Twenty-five detailed interviews were conducted with environmental managers from 
the building-chemicals sector. The questionnaire on which the interviews were based 
was designed with reference to the OECD survey
5 “Environmental Policy and Firm-
Level Management”, and is included in Appendix C. The questionnaire comprised 
three  main  sections,  designed  to  obtain  critical  information  pertaining  to:  (i) 
organization  features,  (ii)  relevant  public  environmental  policy;  (iii)  competitive 
performance,  such  as  business  performance,  innovation  performance,  resource 
efficiency and intangible-related performance. The selection of firms for interview 
was carried out in three steps: (i) selection of NACE codes relevant to the Italian 
building-chemicals  sector;  (ii)  identification  of  all  active  organizations  classified 
according with the selected codes located within the Padania region – information 
from the Italian Chamber of Commerce; (iii) randomised selection of 25 organizations 
for interview.  
Since the data from the study were collected using survey techniques, it is important 
to  address  the  limitations  of  the  survey  data.  The  common  method  variance  (i.e., 
variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the constructs) 
is a potential problem in behavioural research There are several causes of method 
bias. Some sources of common method bias result from the fact that the predictor and 
criterion variables are obtained from the same  source or rater, whereas others are 
produced by the measurement items themselves, the context of the items within the 
measurement  instrument,  and/or  the  context  in  which  the  measures  are  obtained 
(Podoskoff et al., 2003). In order to minimize the common method bias that can affect 
a questionnaire survey, according to the scheme proposed by Podoskoff et al. (2003, 






2.4. Italian building-chemicals manufacturers:  data analysis 
                                                 
5  See http://www.oecd.org/document/37/0,3343,en_2649_34333_2388581_1_1_1_1,00.html for 
further details. 
6 The procedures can be summarize as follows: 
·  We created a methodological separation amongst the different measurements of the study. This 
guarantees  a  temporal  and  psychological  separation.  Furthermore,  we  used  different  response 
formats for the questions. 
·  In  order  to  minimize  the  items  ambiguity  we  didn’t  use  ambiguous  or  unfamiliar  terms;    we 
avoided vague concepts or complicated syntax; we kept questions simple, specific, and concise; 
·  In order to reduce the acquiescence we avoided the use of bipolar numerical scale values (e.g., –3 
to _3), providing verbal labels for the midpoints of scales; 
·  In  order  to  minimize  socially  desirable,  lenient,  acquiescent,  and  consistent  bias,  all  our 
respondents were guaranteed anonymity  
Environmental managers were asked to assess a set of regulatory instruments in terms 
of  perceived  influence  on  their  own  organization's  production  activities,  including 
direct  regulations  (input  bans,  technology  and  performance  based  standards), 
economic instruments (e.g. emissions and input taxes and tradable emissions permits), 
and soft instruments (e.g. voluntary agreements, demand information measures, green 
public procurement). Meanwhile, the stringency of environmental regulation may be 
quantified in numerous ways: compliance costs, the number of new regulations taking 
effect, discrepancy between non-constrained emissions and actual emissions, and the 
number of inspections (Telle and Larsson, 2007). In our study we use the number of 
inspections  as  an  indicator of  regulatory  stringency  for several reasons. First, this 
indicator has been used for some time, in a number of studies (e.g.  Laplante and 
Rilstone,  1996).  Second,  the  frequency  of  inspection  is  often  determined  by  EU 
environmental laws (such as the IPPC Directive and the ETS Directive) that target 
regulate  the  potentially  most  environmentally  damaging  plants.  In  addition,  the 
perceived  degree  of  regulatory  stringency  was  ascertained  from  answers  to  the 
question “How would you describe the environmental policy regime to which your 
facility is subject?”. 
 
Independent quantitative data on competitive performance were not available at the 
firm  level,  so  we  used  specific  survey  questions  to  establish  firm-level 
competitiveness,  in  accordance  with  previous  studies.  Different  dimensions  of 
competitiveness were represented by three key variables: market performance (Levy, 
1995, Gray and Shadbegian, 1998), innovation capabilities (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997, 
Rennings  et  al.  2006)  and  intangible  assets  (Halle  1992,  Fouts  &  Russo  1997). 
Categorised responses to questions regarding competitive performance were assigned 
scores of 1 (worst performance) to 5 (best performance), whilst responses to questions 
regarding the importance of different regulatory instruments were assigned scores of 1 
(not important) to 3 (very important). This provided for statistical analysis to test for 
associations between regulatory parameters and competitiveness parameters. 
 
In order to analyze how the environmental policy stringency and direct regulation 
affect competitive performance and, in particular, the technical innovation of firms in 
the  building-chemicals  sector,  we  applied  a  two  step  statistical  model.  Firstly,  a 
Spearman’s correlation test was used to identify any significant associations between 
the degree of perceived regulatory stringency, the impact of direct regulation, and 
different  measures  of  competitiveness  (business  performance,  innovation 
performance,  intangible  assets).  Following  confirmation  of  significant  associations 
between the stringency and the form of environmental regulation on one side, and the 
competitive performance on the other, we decided to explore these associations in 
more depth. Regression analyses
 using ordered probit
7 models were applied in order 
to test two main hypotheses in relation to the Padania building-chemicals:  
H1. How does the environmental policy stringency affect the technical innovation of 
firms in the building-chemicals sector?  
H2.  How  does  the  form  of  environmental  regulation  (direct  regulation)  affect  the 
technical innovation of firms in the building- chemicals sector?  
 
                                                 
7 The ordered probit is a generalization of the popular probit analysis, used for ordinal multinomial 
dependent variables. Results of the correlation tests were used to inform our selection of “investments in 
technical innovation” as the dependent variable. Independent variables included were 
the  two  measures  of  environmental  regulation  stringency,  and  two  major  direct 
regulations  applied  to  the  investigated  sector  (input  bans  and  technical-based 
standards). Finally, we considered the influence of firm size and age (number of years 
from foundation) as exogenous variables. 




3.1. Environmental effectiveness  
 
It  is  clear  from  both  the  Irish  and  Italian  case  studies  that  direct  regulation  was 
perceived  to  have  had  the  greatest  influence  on  process  modifications  (Fig.  1). 
Technology- and performance- based standards were perceived by 79% and 75% of 
Italian  building-chemicals  sector  respondents,  respectively,  to  have  had  a  “very 
important”  impact  on  operations  (Fig.  1).  Similarly,  environmental  managers  in 
Ireland’s pharma sector perceive integrated licensing to have been the major driver of 
pollution avoidance, despite widespread participation in voluntary schemes such as 
ISO14001, EMAS, and CSR initiatives. For the 27 core pharma installations, IPPC 
regulation  resulted  in  annual  pollution  loading  being  reduced  by  a  further  59% 
relative to BAU and voluntary regulations (Fig. 2). According to ecological damage 
potential,  pollution  avoidance  attributed  to  IPPC  regulation  was  dominated  by 
reductions in volatile organic compounds (VOC), SOx and NOx emissions to air, and 
heavy metal emissions to water (Fig. 2). According to economic damage potential, 
IPPC  regulation  resulted  in  a  76%  reduction  in  pollution  relative  to  BAU  and 
voluntary emission reductions, largely attributable to the reduction in SOx emissions 
(Fig. 5).    
 
Economic instruments (emissions or effluent taxes or charges, input/output taxes, and 
tradable  emissions  permits)  were  also  perceived  to  have  a  large  influence  on 
operational decisions, though less than direct regulation. Averaged across the four 
types of economic instrument specified, 53% of Italian building-chemical respondents 
perceived  them  to  have  had  a  very  important  influence  on  operations  (Fig.  1). 
Although most Irish Pharma installations participate in the EU ETS, the 15% CO2 
emission avoidance relative to BAU was low compared with other emissions (Fig. 2).  
 
 
Italian  building-chemicals  firms  are  subject  to  a  wide  variety  of  soft  instruments, 
including  voluntary  industry  agreements,  and  communication  and  information 
measures  such  as  ecolabels.  Averaged  across  the  six  types  of  soft  regulatory 
instrument included in the Italian Chem for buildings survey, just 27% of respondents 
perceived  them  to  have  had  a  very  important  influence  on  operations  (Fig.  1). 
Similarly,  environmental  managers  in  Ireland’s  pharma  sector  ranked  voluntary 
regulation as the least important driver of environmental performance improvement 
(Styles et al., 2009b). Green public procurement stands out among soft instruments as 
being perceived to have had a very important influence on operations by 56% of 
Italian Chem for buildings respondents (Fig. 1).  
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Fig. 1. The influence of specific environmental policy instruments on firm operations, 








































































Fig. 2. "Business As Usual" (includes effect of voluntary regulation) and "Actual" 
2007 pollution profiles, based on the ecological damage potemtial of emissions, for 
the 27 core pharma installations. The difference represents the specific influence of 
IPPC regulation. 
*BAU profile based on production-based extrapolation of 1995 emissions, scaled 
down to acount for median air and water emission avoidances attributed to non-IPPC 
influences in survey responses.    
 
 
 3.2. Efficiency and competitive effects  
 
As demonstrated in the literature, the concept of competitiveness may be considered 
from  a  number  of  perspectives  and  at  a  number  of  levels.  Focusing  on  direct 
regulation, we analyze effects on different dimensions of competitiveness at the firm 
level,  represented  by  three  key  variables:  resource  efficiency  (cost  reduction), 
innovation capabilities (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997, Rennings et al. 2006) and intangible 
assets (Hall 1992).  
  
Based on information provided by seven Irish pharma respondents to Survey 1, mean 
IPPC  compliance  costs  were  €1.6  million  per  installation  in  2007.  Based  on  a 
breakdown provided by five respondents, these costs were dominated by operating 
and  maintaining  environmental  systems  (Fig.  4).  Respondents  apportioned 
compliance expenditure in the ratios 20%, 30% and 50% to controlling air emissions, 
water  emissions,  and  waste,  respectively.  Extrapolated  up  to  the  27  core  Pharma 
installations  (Fig.  3),  annual  expenditure  on  air  and  water  emission  control  was 
estimated at €21.64 million (Table 4). Using lower and higher external cost estimates 
for emissions, the social economic benefit attributable to emissions avoided through 
direct  regulation  ranges  from  17.15  to  is  49.98  M€  (Table  4).  Social  benefit  is 
dominated by avoidance of 2485 tonnes of SOx per annum (Table 4; Fig. 5). The 
basic benefit to cost ratio for IPPC emissions control in the pharma sector ranges from 
0.8 to 2.3, with a median value of 1.6. A more comprehensive cost assessment of 
environmental  damage  would  yield  a  higher  benefit  to  cost  ratio,  as  indicated  by 
divergence between the ecological (Fig. 2) and economic (Fig. 5) pollution damage 
profiles
8. Based on application of median external costs, IPPC regulation has resulted 
in a net economic benefit of 11.9 M€ per annum. These calculations exclude indirect 
effects of IPPC regulation on efficiency and competitiveness.  
   
Of the eight Irish Pharma respondents to Survey 1, five had adopted new process 
technologies, and three had adopted new process techniques (in addition to simple 
abatement technologies and techniques) as a result of integrated licensing (Table 1). 
Four  respondents  indicated  that  licensing  had  a  positive  influence  on  operating 
efficiency (Table 1), and one respondent specifically attributed energy and resource 
efficiency  savings  to  implementation  of  extended  batch-production  campaigns 
required  as  part  of  the  installation’s  mandatory  EMP.  Other  comments  attributed 
positive  effects  to  the  provision  of  technical  guidance  documentation  and 
enhancement of corporate image, but also to the implementation of more consistent 
regulation  across  competitors,  and  improved  access  to  markets  with  strict 
environmental  standards.  Conversely,  four  of  the  eight  respondents  to  Survey  1 
indicated that compliance with integrated licensing had constrained production output 
(Table 1). Comments suggest that this occurred primarily due to shut-downs required 
to  prevent  ELV  exceedence  on  particular  occasions  (e.g.  if  abatement  systems 
malfunctioned or became over-loaded). Similarly, whilst eight Survey 2 respondents 
remarked  that  IPPC  regulation  was  very  effective  at  driving  environmental 
performance  improvements,  six  complained  that  it  was  too  bureaucratic,  and  four 
thought  that  it  resulted  in  sub-optimal  outcomes  (from  an  economic  and 
                                                 
8 The pollution index represents ecological damage potential across six major impact categories 
(acidification potential, aquatic toxicity potential, eutrophication potential, global warming potential, 
human toxicity potential, tropospheric ozone formation potential), whilst the economic damage profile 
is derived primarily from estimates of human health impacts.  environmental  perspective).  On  balance,  respondents  perceived  IPPC  licensing  to 
have had a slight positive effect on their competitiveness within Ireland and Europe, 
but a negative effect on their competitiveness globally.  
  
For  the  Italian  building-chemicals  sector,  positive  relationships  were  observed 
between direct regulation in the form of input bans (but not technical standards or any 
other form of regulation) and innovation (Table 2). Furthermore, some measures of 
competitiveness  were  found  to  be  positively  correlated  with  the  stringency  of 
environmental  regulation,  as  indicated  by  inspection  frequency  and  perceived 
stringency (Table 2 and Table 3). Specifically, the regression analysis (probit model) 
reveals that more frequent environmental inspections were associated with increased 
investment in technical and product innovation (the sign of coefficients is positive and 
significant  at 95%). There is tentative evidence that more stringent  environmental 
regulation  is  associated  with  stronger  business  performance  generated  by  green 
products, though the association is statistically weak (p < 0.1: Table 2). Meanwhile, 
economic and soft instruments, whilst not correlated with innovation, were correlated 
with intangible assets – most notably soft instruments and reputation (Table 2). Direct 
regulation in the form of technical standards was weakly associated with technician’s 
competence.   
 
Table 1. Responses to key questions provided in detailed questionnaire returns from 
eight environmental managers in Ireland’s Pharma sector (Survey 1). 
 
Yes No
New process technology? 5 3
New abatement technology? 5 3
New process techniques? 3 5
New abatement techniques? 7 1
Identification of efficiencies? 4 4
Provision of BAT information? 6 2
Regulation of competitors? 5 3
Enhancing corporate image? 7 1
Improving access to markets? 4 4
Production? 4 4
Costs? 8 0
Pos Neg None Net
Within Ireland? 3 1 4 2
Within EU? 3 2 3 1
Gloablly? 2 4 1 -2
Question Response
Has licensing had 





negative effects in 
relation to... 
What has been the 






 Table 2. Spearman correlation test among Policy stringency measures and 















Overall performance -0.13 -.002 0.19 -0.13 -0.15 -0,32 -0.41 -0.01
"Green Business" perf. 0.36* 0.40* -0.27 -0.12 -0.26 -0,03 -0.13 -0.06
Technical innovation 0.42** 0.58*** 0.42* 0.27 0.04 0,1 0.34 -0.02
Product innovation 0.43** 0.47** 0.44** 0.08 -0.16 0,24 0.06 -0.10
Reputation 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.002 0,16 0.61*** 0.51**
Personell motivation 0.29 0.23 -0.10 0.29 0.26 0.46** 0.26 0.23











***p < 0.01      
** p < 0.05   
* p < 0.1 
 
 
Table 3. Results of the ordered probit regression model testing for the relationship 
between the listed variables and technical innovation.    
Coefficient Std Err.z p value
Policy stringency 1.70 0.83 **
Inspection frequency 1.16 0.46 **
Input bans 1.40 0.83 *
Technical standards -1.34 1.05
No. employeees -0.01 0.01








***p < 0.01      
** p < 0.05   










 Table 4. Mass annual emission avoidance specifically attributable to direct regulation 
(integrated licensing) for 27 core Pharma installations in Ireland. Lower and higher 
estimates of avoided pollution are compared with extrapolated compliance costs.       
Emission Reg. effect












W-HMs 0,8 1 180
d 192 480
d 0,97 159
A-PM 2,0 26 000
e 75 000
f 53 154
A-SOx 2.485 5 600
e 16 000
f 13.917 39.764









A-NH3 2,3 11 000
e 31 000
f 26 72






Annual Benefit   (k€) 17146 49982
Annual Cost   (k€) 21638 21638
Benefit Cost Ratio 0,8 2,3
€ t
-1




a = calculated relative to nitrogen based on eutrophication potential (from Guinée et 
al., 2002)  
b = minimum values quoted by O'Doherty and Toll (2007) 
c = maximum values quoted by O'Doherty and Toll (2007) 
d = estimated at twice TP impact 
e = low external cost estimates from BAT-assessment guidance document (EC, 2006), 
based on Value of Life Year median for PM and ozone mortality, inclusion of health 
core, crop effects, and sum of means over 35 ppb volume concentration.   
f = high external estimates from BAT-assessment guidance document (EC, 2006), 
based on Value of Statistical Life mean for PM mortality, Value of Life Year mean 
for O3 mortality, inclusion of health core, health sensitivity and crop effects, and sum 
of means over 0 ppb volume concentration.   
g = half of ExternE estimate (EC, 2005) 
h = twice ExternE estimate (EC, 2005) 
i = approximated to twice PM cost 


















































Fig. 3. Aggregate pollution loading for the seven installations that provided 
compliance-cost data in Survey 1, for the 27 installations that reported throughout 















Fig. 4. Average breakdown of annual licence compliance costs between 1995 and 


































































































Fig. 5. "Business As Usual" and actual 2007 (IPPC influenced) pollution profiles, 




4.1. Direct regulation drives pollution avoidance  
  
This paper has emerged from the chance observation at a conference that two entirely 
separate projects, focussed on the Irish pharma and Italian building-chemicals sectors, 
appeared  to  be  supporting  the  same  broad  conclusions  about  environmental 
regulation. Although relatively small in terms of the number of installations studied, 
these two studies contain lines of complementary empirical evidence that combine to 
support some important conclusions about environmental regulation, from a multi-
pollutant perspective and in the context of existing literature. 
 
It is clear from questionnaire responses that IPPC licensing is seen as the major driver 
of considerable pollution reductions achieved by Ireland’s pharma sector. What wider 
conclusions can be drawn from this example? On the one hand, the experience of this 
profitable export-driven and compliant sector could exaggerate the influence of direct 
regulation, and underestimate the influence on competitiveness (Lee, 2008), for other 
less  compliant  (EPA,  2006)  and  less  profitable  sectors.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
important influence of direct regulation on a sector with a long history of voluntary 
regulation (EMS accreditation, CSR, voluntary reporting initiative) emphasises the 
greater effectiveness, and the associated additional social benefit, of direct regulation. 
Tentative evidence of “over-compliance” with BAT standards (Clinch  and Kerins, 
2002; Styles et al., 2009b) may reflect a risk-averse approach to future regulation 
taken  by  this  well-financed  sector.  However,  it  may  also  be  explained  by  the 
perception  that  IPPC  regulation  has  driven  process  innovation  beyond  BAT,  by 
requiring  environmental  considerations  to  be  integrated  into  process  management. 
This would indicate that IPPC regulation is achieving genuine and efficient pollution 
prevention as intended within the original directive (96/61/EC).  
 Italian building-chemical firm managers also regarded direct regulatory instruments 
as  having  the  greatest  influence  on  operations,  compared  with  economic  and  soft 
instruments. Environmental performance of the Italian building-chemicals sector was 
not measured directly, so we assume here that it is positively  associated with the 
influence on operations perceived by questionnaire respondents. It is possible that the 
cumulative influence of the different regulatory approaches differs from the average 
ratings for the respective instruments. Nonetheless, the overarching finding from the 
Italian  and  Irish  studies  that  direct  regulation  is  a  major  driver  of  environmental 
performance is in agreement with other recent studies demonstrating the effectiveness 
of direct regulations (Silvo et al., 2002; Environment Agency, 2004; Honkasalo et al., 
2005; EEA, 2008; Mirasgedis et al., 2008).  
 
 
4.2. Competitive impacts of direct regulation 
 
Our basic cost benefit assessment indicates that the pollution avoidance achieved by 
IPPC regulation of Ireland’s pharma sector has had a positive net economic benefit 
over  and  above  the  significant  business-as-usual  improvements  that  were  at  least 
partly associated with voluntary regulation. More complete costing of environmental 
impacts  would  increase  the  benefit  attributable  to  IPPC  regulation.  Consequently, 
IPPC  regulation  has  clearly  improved  the  social  efficiency  of  production  from  a 
neoclassical economics perspective (Fig. 5). Although other positive assessments of 
cost-effectiveness have been made for IPPC regulation (e.g. Clinch and Kerins, 2002; 
AEA, 2007), our finding is important because it is underpinned by highly quantitative 
and  comprehensive  data  on  pollution  avoidance  that  was  specifically  attributed  to 
IPPC regulation (not approximated to total observed reductions or calculated from a 
hypothetical  BAT  effect).  The  data  presented  in  this  paper  did  not  enable  a 
disaggregated  comparison  of  reduction  costs  for  specific  emissions  between  the 
pharma and other sectors, as would be required for a traditional economic assessment 
of the comparative efficiency of IPPC regulation. However, we suggest that isolated 
consideration of abatement costs for individual pollutants can be misleading given the 
wide  range  of  pollutants  that  require  regulatory  control.  We  conclude  that  direct 
regulation drives industry further towards socially ‘optimum’ pollution levels than 
voluntary regulation.  
 
There  was  evidence  within  questionnaire  responses  from  both  Irish  and  Italian 
industry  that  regulation,  particularly  direct  and  stringent  regulation,  can  drive 
innovation  and  improve  production  efficiency,  as  suggested  by  Poter  and  van  der 
Linde  (1995a;b).  Italian  respondents  indicated  that  stringent  direct  regulation  may 
improve realisation of green business opportunities. Specifically, it appears that more 
stringent  regulation  can  stimulate  firms  to  concentrate  on  more  environmental-
friendly  products  that  in  turn  are  commercially  successful.  These  results  are  in 
agreement  with  Costantini  and  Crespi  (2008),  who  noted  a  positive  association 
between  stringent  environmental  regulation  and  technology  and  innovation 
investment  among  Italian  firms.  However,  in  our  study,  efficiency  improvements 
were not perceived to have translated into competitive advantage. Isolating the effect 
of regulation on competitiveness is known to be challenging (López-Gamero, 2009), 
owing  to  confounding  factors  such  as  the  tendency  for  larger,  more  efficient 
installations  to  be  more  responsive  to  environmental  regulations  (Hitchens  et  al., 
2001; Radonjič and Tominc, 2007). With regard to EU-level environmental policy, it is  notable  that  Irish  pharma  respondents  perceived  competitiveness  impacts  to  be 
limited overall, and positive at the EU level owing to the creation of a level-playing-
field. Significant correlations between economic and soft regulation and intangible 
assets  could  lead  to  longer-term,  and  thus  difficult  to  attribute,  competitive 
advantages.   
 
Complete  assessment  of  the  efficiency  of  different  approaches  to  environmental 
regulation is beyond the scope of any single study owing to the range of direct and 
indirect competitive effects and the scope of environmental performance that should 
be  considered.  Results  presented  here  do  not  represent  a  quantitative  efficiency 
comparison  across  approaches,  but  do  offer  some  insight  into  the  real-world 
efficiency  of  direct  regulation.  Many  comparisons  of  abatement  costs  across 
approaches  focus  on  individual  pollutants.  The  pollution  index  used  in  this  study 
integrated  the  major  air  and  water  pollutants,  but  still  excluded  important 
environmental parameters that must be controlled, and that should be considered in 
any complete assessment of regulation (waste generation, land contamination, noise, 
odour and accident prevention). For many non-readily estimable pollutants (e.g. NOx 
emissions, heavy metals to water), a verifiable monitoring and reporting framework is 
required  before  any  form  of  regulation  can  be  implemented
9.  We  suggest  that 
comprehensive  command-and-control  regulation,  such  as  IPPC  licensing,  remains 
essential to these objectives, whilst offering the opportunity to achieve efficiencies 
through  coordinated  control  of  processes  and  pollutants  (Tollefsen  et  al.,  2009). 
Consideration  of  sectoral  affordability  in  BAT  determination  also  provides  a 
transparent rationale in which to accommodate the economic / political constraints 
that often impede the implementation of regulations designed to achieve least-cost 
pollution reduction (Ellerman, 2003; Palm and Larsson, 2007). Thus, we conclude 
that stringent and integrated direct regulation is an essential component of industrial 
pollution  control,  and  the  efficiency  of  this  approach  relative  to  economic  and 
voluntary  approaches  is  often  underestimated.  Although  less  influential  to  date, 
economic  and  voluntary  instruments  have  important  roles  to  play  alongside  direct 
regulation  in  driving  environmental  performance  improvements,  especially  for 





Empirical evidence from two separate studies emphasises that direct regulation has 
been the main driver of environmental performance improvements in both the Irish 
pharma  and  Italian  building-chemicals  sectors.  It  has  been  considerably  more 
effective  than  voluntary  regulation.  From  a  neoclassical  economics  perspective, 
stringent  direct  regulation  implemented  through  direct  (IPPC)  regulation  has 
improved the social efficiency of pharmaceutical production in Ireland. In addition, 
industry perceptions conveyed in questionnaire responses suggested that the direct 
costs  of  regulation  may  be  offset  somewhat  by  efficiency  and  organisational 
improvements  attributable  to  regulation  (in  particular  to  innovation  stimulated  by 
direct  and  stringent  regulation).  This  finding,  along  with  direct  questionnaire 
                                                 
9 For Ireland’s pharma sector, emissions monitoring and reporting enforced under IPPC regulation is 
substantially  more  complete,  and  has  greater  influence,  than  monitoring  and  reporting  undertaken 
through voluntary initiatives (Styles et al., 2009b).  
 responses, suggests that harmful production-efficiency and competitiveness impacts 
attributed to regulation (e.g. the pollution haven theory) are typically overstated, and 
in any case less important when regulation is implemented at the EU level. These 
findings support the Resource-Based view of environmental regulation. 
 
Regulation is required to control a wide range of pollutants from industry, and all 
forms of regulation require verifiable data regarding pollution quantities. Combined 
with the above findings, these factors provide a strong rationale for policy-makers and 
regulators to continue focussing on integrated direct regulation as a central tenet of 
industrial  pollution  control.  This  study  did  not  directly  compare  the  efficiency  of 
different regulatory approaches. Further studies are required to do this within the full 
context of pollution control (i.e. considering verification of pollution monitoring and 
reporting, the whole suite of parameters that require regulation, and any stimulated 
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